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MOOT PROBLEM 2005
PACE LAW SCHOOL WISHES TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE VALUA-
BLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF DR. ROY S. LEE WHOSE ORIGINAL
PROBLEM AND BRIEFS FOR THE JUDGE, PROSECUTOR AND
VICTIMS, DEVELOPED FOR USE WITH HIS CLASSES AT CO-
LUMBIA LAW SCHOOL AND THE HAGUE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW NETWORK, WERE UTILIZED AS THE MOOT
PROBLEM FOR THE COMPETITION.
Pace Law School
International Criminal Court Moot 2005
Facts:
1. In September 2001, after four years of continuous fighting in
Vineland between the central government and three ethnic
groups from the southern and northern regions seeking inde-
pendence, all the parties to the conflict signed a peace agree-
ment. The parties agreed to form a democratic, coalition
government whose power would be shared by all the ethnic
groups in the country. In January 2002, the Security Council
authorized UNVINE to deploy 500 military personnel and 600
civilian personnel to Vineland to verify cessation of hostilities,
to set up a security zone for civilians and refugees, and to make
preparations for the forthcoming elections in the various re-
gions. The Secretary-General was requested to invite member
States to contribute forces, civilian personnel and equipment to
UNVINE in order to carry out the mandate. Member States
Katonia and Ridgeland both committed and deployed soldiers
and paratroopers to the UNVINE mission in Vineland.
2. In June 2002, the ANVA, an insurgent group from the north-
ern region, broke away from the coalition government due to
dissatisfaction over the number of ANVA seats in the new gov-
ernment and over its oil revenue shares from oil deposits in the
northern region.
3. Meanwhile at the United Nations, the Security Council was
considering the renewal of its peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-
land. In that context, the Katonia representative warned the
Security Council that it would not participate in this or other
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UN peacekeeping missions unless the Council granted it
soldiers immunity from prosecution by the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC). They feared others might use the new Court
for political reasons to investigate or prosecute its soldiers. In
late June, Katonia vetoed a draft renewing the UN peacekeep-
ing mission in Bosnialand but agreed to extend the deadline for
15 days pending further negotiation on the question of exemp-
tion of its soldiers from ICC jurisdiction.
4. On 1 July 2002, the Statute of the ICC entered into force be-
tween the States Parties to the Statute and empowered the
Court to prosecute and punish persons who committed geno-
cide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity in the territory of
the States Parties where the competent national courts are ei-
ther "unwilling" or "not available" to exercise their jurisdiction.
Since then, more than 85 states (including Vineland) have be-
come Parties to the Statute, accepting jurisdiction of the Court
in accordance with the Statute and in particular the principle of
complimentarity.
5. On 10 July 2002, unidentified armed groups in Vineland at-
tacked UNVINE peacekeeping forces stationed outside Bridge-
town in the northern region. Ten Katonia soldiers and 15
Ridgeland paratroopers were killed. Newspapers in neighboring
countries reported that the attack was paid for by "foreign oil
companies interested in keeping the UN peacekeepers out of the
region."
6. Katonia and Ridgeland decided to send an additional 200
paratroopers to assist their soldiers and launched, in retalia-
tion, a ten-day aerial bombing of the general area of the attacks.
In addition paratroopers from Katonia and Ridgeland cordoned
off the surrounding areas and conducted house-to-house raids
detaining approximately 50 men and 20 boys. These detainees
were taken to a detention compound where they were observed
in order to determine if there were any insurgents amongst
them. Four of the men were tortured in an isolated area of the
camp where there were no civilian witnesses. One of the tor-
tured men died (the cause of death was later determined to be a
heart attack). According to reports from reputable non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), several ANVA training camps
were destroyed and many insurgents killed. Thousands of acres
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of farmland were ruined; large quantities of crops and livestock
were also destroyed. Numerous unexploded bombs lined the
roadsides and the fields. After the Katonia and Ridgeland para-
troopers removed the cordon and left the area, many families
complained to representatives of various NGO's that personal
property had been stolen by the paratroopers while conducting
the house-to-house searches.
7. On 12 July 2002, the Security Council adopted unanimously
resolution 1234 (2002) that effectively gave a twelve-month ex-
emption from prosecution by the ICC to Vineland peacekeepers
taking part in UN peacekeeping operations. The operative part
of the resolution reads:
The Security Council
"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Requests consistent with the provisions of article 16 of the
Rome Statute that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or
former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party
to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United
Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-
moth period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with
investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security
Council decide otherwise;
2. Expresses the intention to renew the request in paragraph 1
under the same conditions each 1 July for further twelve-moth
periods for as long as may be necessary.
8. Many States Parties to the Rome Statute considered this con-
cession to Katonia a political necessity in order to preserve UN
peacekeeping missions and to avoid a showdown with Katonia,
which was prepared to veto all future peacekeeping operations.
They believed, however, that the resolution modified article 16
of the Rome Statute and was inconsistent with the Statute.
9. Consistent with its policy to prevent its soldiers from falling
under ICC jurisdiction, Katonia concluded what it called "Arti-
cle 98 Agreements" with nations in various regions of the world,
including Vineland and Ridgeland. In these bilateral agree-
ments, the parties concerned agreed that Katonia's soldiers
would not be surrendered to the ICC without Katonia's consent.
10. On 20 July 2002, acting on Vineland government intelli-
gence reports, Katonia and Ridgeland ordered their paratroop-
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ers to bomb ANVA headquarters. Two days later, the Human
Rights Monitors (HRM), an NGO, reported that this bombing
had in fact destroyed three villages, killing three hundred civil-
ians, including women and children, and seriously injuring 550
more.
11. On the same day, ANVA captured three Katonia and two
Ridgeland pilots whose planes had encountered engine trouble
and landed in a nearby marsh. It was believed that these pilots
had engaged in the bombing missions that had resulted in civil-
ian fatalities. Soon after the bombing ended, approximately 100
individuals stormed a local police station where it was known
that four Ridgeland military police, who had taken part in the
earlier house-to-house searches, were stationed as trainers and
consultants to the local police force.
a. The four Ridgeland military police officers were recognized by
several women in the mob who accused them of having taken
their husbands and sons. The four were overwhelmed by the mob
and taken prisoner.
b. These four Ridgeland soldiers were later handed over to the
ANVA insurgents who had just captured the five pilots accused of
the aerial bombing raids.
12. Some ANVA members wanted to execute the captured pilots
and military police officers immediately. HRM persuaded the
ANVA leaders that an ANVA military tribunal should try the
captives for the crimes they had committed. Katonia and Ridge-
land issued strong warnings to ANVA that they would face fur-
ther military action if the captives were not released
immediately. To de-escalate an explosive situation, the Secre-
tary-General of the UN sent his special representative (SRSG)
to negotiate with ANVA. The SRSG proposed two alternatives to
the ANVA tribunal; try the pilots in a neutral third country or
in the ICC at The Hague.
13. There were serious political and legal difficulties in finding
a third country that was acceptable to ANVA and at the same
time willing to try the captured soldiers. Meanwhile, Katonia
and Ridgeland continued to threaten immediate military repri-
sals. To prevent imminent attack, ANVA reluctantly accepted to
surrender the accused to the ICC at The Hague in October
2003, through the offices of the Secretary General. Neither
[Vol. 17:249
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss2/5
20051 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT MOOT 2005 253
Katonia nor Ridgeland made any statement or announcement
on the surrender. Vineland issued an official statement that it
had no intention to exercise jurisdiction over the accused.
PACE LAW SCHOOL WISHES TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE
VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF DR. ROY S. LEE WHOSE
ORIGINAL PROBLEM AND BRIEFS FOR THE JUDGE,
PROSECUTOR AND VICTIMS, DEVELOPED FOR USE
WITH HIS CLASSES AT COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL AND
THE HAGUE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW NET-
WORK, WERE UTILIZED AS THE ABOVE MOOT PROBLEM
FOR THE COMPETITION.
Agreement
between the Government of Katonia and the
Government of Vineland regarding the surrender of
persons to the International Criminal Court
The Government of Katonia and the Government of Vineland,
hereinafter, "the parties."
Reaffirming the importance of bringing to justice those who
commit genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes,
Recalling that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court done at Rome on 17 July 1998 by the United Nations Dip-
lomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court is intended to complement and
not supplant national criminal jurisdiction,
Considering that Vineland, by becoming a State Party to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, has ex-
pressed its commitment to be bound by the rules and principles
embodied therein,
Considering that the Government of Katonia has expressed its
intention to investigate and to prosecute where appropriate acts
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court al-
leged to have been committed by officials, employees, military
personnel or other nationals of Katonia,
Bearing in mind Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court;
Hereby agree as follows:
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Article 1
For purposes of this agreement, "persons" are current or former
Government officials, employees (including contractors), or mil-
itary personnel or nationals of one Party,
Article 2
Persons of one party present in the territory of the other shall
not, absent expressed consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court for any purpose, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other
entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the
purpose of surrender to or transfer to the International Crimi-
nal Court.
Article 3
When the Government of Katonia extradites, surrenders, or
other wise transfers a person of the other Party to a third coun-
try, Katonia will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that
person to the International Criminal Court by the third coun-
try, absent expressed consent of the Government of Vineland.
Article 4
When the Government of Vineland extradites, surrenders, or
other wise transfers a person of the other Party to a third coun-
try, Katonia will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that
person to the International Criminal Court by the third coun-
try, absent expressed consent of the Government of Katonia.
Article 5
This agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of notes
confirming that each Party has completed the necessary domes-
tic legal requirements to bring the Agreement into force. It will
remain in force until one year after the date on which one Party
notifies the other of its intent to terminate this Agreement. The
provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with re-
spect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the
effective date of termination.
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Done in Vineland, in duplicate, this first day of August, 2002 in
the Katonia and Vineland languages, each text being equally
authentic. In case of disputes, the Katonia version of this agree-
ment will prevail.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly author-
ized by the respective Governments, having signed this
Agreement
/S/ /S/
For the Government of For the Government of
Katonia Vineland
UNITED NATIONS
Distr.
GENERAL
S/RES/1234 (2002)
12 July 2002
RESOLUTION 1234 (2002)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4046th meeting,
on 12 July 2002
The Security Council,
Recalling the statement of its President of 12 February 1999 (S/
PRST/1999/6),
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 Sep-
tember 1999 (S/1999/957) submitted to the Security Council in
accordance with the above-mentioned statement,
Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General of 13 April
1998 on the "Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable
Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa" (S/1998/318) and
22 September 1998 on the "Protection for Humanitarian Assis-
tance to Refugees and Others in Conflict Situations" (S/1998/
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883), in particular their analysis related to the protection of
civilians,
Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of casualties
in armed conflicts and are increasingly targeted by combatants
and armed elements, gravely concerned by the hardships borne
by civilians during armed conflict, in particular as a result of
acts of violence directed against them, especially women, chil-
dren and other vulnerable groups, including refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons, and recognizing the consequent impact
this will have on durable peace, reconciliation and development,
Bearing in mind its primary responsibility under the Charter of
the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and underlining the importance of taking mea-
sures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution,
Stressing the need to address the causes of armed conflict in a
comprehensive manner in order to enhance the protection of ci-
vilians on a long-term basis, including by promoting economic
growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, national
reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and
respect for and protection of human rights,
Expressing its deep concern at the erosion in respect for inter-
national humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and
principles during armed conflict, in particular deliberate acts of
violence against all those protected under such law, and expres-
sing also its concern at the denial of safe and unimpeded access
to people in need,
Underlining the importance of the widest possible dissemina-
tion of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee
law and of relevant training for, inter alia, civilian police,
armed forces, members of the judicial and legal professions,
civil society and personnel of international and regional
organizations,
Recalling the statement of its President of 8 July 1999 (S/PRST/
1999/21), and emphasizing its call for the inclusion, as appropri-
ate, within specific peace agreements and, on a case-by-case ba-
sis, within United Nations peacekeeping mandates, of clear
terms for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
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ex-combatants, including the safe and timely disposal of arms
and ammunition,
1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September
1999, and takes note of the comprehensive recommendations
contained therein;
2. Emphasizes the importance of preventing conflicts which
could endanger international peace and security and, in this
context, highlights the importance of implementing appropriate
preventive measures to resolve conflicts, including the use of
United Nations and other dispute settlement mechanisms and
of preventive military and civilian deployments, in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, resolutions of the Security Council and relevant interna-
tional instruments;
3. Urges all parties concerned to comply strictly with their obli-
gations under international humanitarian, human rights and
refugee law, in particular those contained in the Hague Conven-
tions of 1899 and 1907 and in the Geneva Conventions of 1949
and their Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as with the deci-
sions of the Security Council;
4. Calls on States which have not already done so to consider
ratifying the major instruments of international humanitarian,
human rights and refugee law, and to take appropriate legisla-
tive, judicial and administrative measures to implement these
instruments domestically, drawing on technical assistance, as
appropriate, from relevant international organizations includ-
ing the International Committee of the Red Cross and United
Nations bodies;
5. Emphasizes the responsibility of States to end impunity and
to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against hu-
manity and serious violations of international humanitarian
law, affirms the possibility, to this end, of using the Interna-
tional Fact-Finding Commission established by Article 90 of the
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, reaffirms
the importance of the work being done by the ad hoc Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, stresses the obligation
of all States to cooperate fully with the Tribunals, and acknowl-
edges the historic significance of the adoption of the Rome Stat-
9
PACE INT'L L. REV.
ute of the International Criminal Court which is open for
signature and ratification by States;
6. Underlines the importance of safe and unhindered access of
humanitarian personnel to civilians in armed conflict, including
refugees and internally displaced persons, and the protection of
humanitarian assistance to them, and recalls in this regard the
statements of its President of 19 June 1997 (S/PRST/1997/34)
and 29 September 1998 (S/PRST/1998/30);
7. Emphasizes the need for combatants to ensure the safety, se-
curity and freedom of movement of United Nations and associ-
ated personnel, as well as personnel of international
humanitarian organizations, and recalls in this regard the
statements of its President of 12 March 1997 (S/PRST/1997/13)
and 29 September 1998;
8. Expresses its willingness to respond to situations of armed
conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian as-
sistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, including
through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Coun-
cil's disposal in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, and notes, in that regard, the relevant recommendations
contained in the report of the Secretary-General;
9. Expresses its willingness to consider how peacekeeping man-
dates might better address the negative impact of armed con-
flict on civilians;
10. Expresses its support for the inclusion, where appropriate,
in peace agreements and mandates of United Nations
peacekeeping missions, of specific and adequate measures for
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-com-
batants, with special attention given to the demobilization and
reintegration of child soldiers, as well as clear and detailed ar-
rangements for the destruction of surplus arms and ammuni-
tion and, in this regard, recalls the statement of its President of
8 July 1999;
11. Notes the importance of including in the mandates of peace-
making, peacekeeping and peace-building operations special
protection and assistance provisions for groups requiring partic-
ular attention, including women and children;
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12. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that United Na-
tions personnel involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and
peace-building activities have appropriate training in interna-
tional humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including
child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communi-
cation skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordina-
tion, and urges States and relevant international and regional
organizations to ensure that appropriate training is included in
their programmes for personnel involved in similar activities;
13. Underlines the importance of civilian police as a component
of peacekeeping operations, recognizes the role of police in as-
suring the safety and well-being of civilians and, in this regard,
acknowledges the need to enhance the capacity of the United
Nations for the rapid deployment of qualified and well-trained
civilian police;
14. Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted
under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give
consideration to their impact on the civilian population, bearing
in mind the needs of children, in order to consider appropriate
humanitarian exemptions;
15. Notes that the excessive accumulation and destabilizing ef-
fect of small arms and light weapons pose a considerable imped-
iment to the provision of humanitarian assistance and have a
potential to exacerbate and prolong conflicts, endanger the lives
of civilians and undermine security and the confidence required
for a return to peace and stability;
16. Takes note of the entry into force of the Convention on the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel
Mines and their Destruction of 1997 and the amended Protocol
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby
Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) annexed to the Conven-
tion on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 1980, recalls the
relevant provisions contained therein, and notes the beneficial
effect that their implementation will have on the safety of
civilians;
17. Reiterates its grave concern at the harmful and widespread
impact of armed conflict on children, recalls its resolution 1261
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(1999) of 25 August 1999, and reaffirms the recommendations
contained therein;
18. Stresses the importance of consultation and cooperation be-
tween the United Nations, the International Committee of the
Red Cross and other relevant organizations, including regional
organizations, on follow-up to the report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral and encourages the Secretary-General to continue consul-
tations on this subject and to take concrete actions aimed at
enhancing the capacity of the United Nations to improve the
protection of civilians in armed conflict;
19. Expresses its willingness also to work in cooperation with
regional organizations to examine how these bodies might bet-
ter enhance the protection of civilians in armed conflict;
20. Decides to establish immediately an appropriate mechanism
to review further the recommendations contained in the report
of the Secretary-General and to consider appropriate steps by
April 2000 in accordance with its responsibilities under the
Charter of the United Nations;
21. Requests consistent with the provisions of article 16 of the
Rome Statute that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or
former officials or personnel from a Contributing State not a
Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a
United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a
twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or pro-
ceed with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless
the Security Council decide otherwise;
22. Expresses the intention to renew the request in paragraph 1
under the same conditions each 1 July for further 12-month pe-
riods for as long as may be necessary.
23. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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